Federal District Court Partially Enjoins Connecticut Charitable Solicitation Law

In Kissel v. Seagull, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut recently granted in part and denied in part a motion for preliminary injunction relating to Connecticut’s Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act. The court provided this helpful summary of its holdings:

This case is about the First Amendment and a Connecticut law that regulates the activities of paid solicitors for charitable organizations. Plaintiff Adam Kissel wishes to engage in paid fundraising work for a non-profit civics education organization. But he claims that a Connecticut law known as the Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act (the “SCFA”) violates his First Amendment right to engage in speech involving charitable fundraising. Kissel now seeks a preliminary injunction.

Kissel first claims that the SCFA is based on a definition of “solicitation” that is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. I do not agree that the law is vague or overbroad simply because it regulates not only “direct” solicitation activity but also “indirect” solicitation activity. Accordingly, I will deny Kissel’s motion for a preliminary injunction as to his challenge to the statutory definition of what activity qualifies as a solicitation.

Kissel next claims that various provisions of the SCFA that apply to paid solicitors violate his First Amendment right to free speech. He challenges four requirements: (1) that he submit to the Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection (“DCP”) a notice 20 days in advance of his intent to engage in solicitation activity; (2) that he submit the text of his intended  solicitations to the DCP; (3) that he tell prospective donors what percentage of their donation will be given to the charitable organization; and (4) that he keep records of donors and donations for the DCP to inspect.

Because every one of these requirements is predicated on a content-based evaluation of the subject matter of Kissel’s speech, I conclude that they are subject to strict scrutiny and that Kissel has established a strong likelihood of success under the demanding strict scrutiny standard. Except as to one of the four requirements (that he tell prospective donors what percentage of their donations will be given to the charitable organization), I conclude that Kissel has shown irreparable harm and that the balance of equities and the public interest weigh in his favor. Accordingly, I will grant the motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Commissioner’s enforcement of the requirement that he submit a notice 20 days before engaging in solicitation, to enjoin the requirement that he submit the text of his intended solicitations, and to enjoin the requirement that he keep records of his donors and donations so that they may be subject to inspection by the DCP.

Lloyd Mayer